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This study develops a theoretical framework that inte- 
grates institutional and network perspectives on the form 
and consequences of administrative innovations. Hypoth- 
eses are tested with survey and archival data on the 
implementation of total quality management (TQM) pro- 
grams and the consequences for organizational efficiency 
and legitimacy in a sample of over 2,700 U.S. hospitals. 
The results show that early adopters customize TQM 
practices for efficiency gains, while later adopters gain 
legitimacy from adopting the normative form of TQM 
programs. The findings suggest that institutional factors 
moderate the role of network membership in affecting 
the form of administrative innovations adopted and pro- 
vide strong evidence for the importance of institutional 
factors in determining how innovations are defined and 
implemented. We discuss implications for theory and re- 
search on institutional processes and network effects and 
for the literatures on innovation adoption and total qual- 
ity management.* 
Researchers in a variety of disciplines have long been inter- 
ested in identifying conditions that facilitate the spread of 
technological and administrative innovations. Early studies in 
this area sought to identify economic and organizational fac- 
tors that encouraged or hindered innovation adoption by indi- 
viduals or organizations. Researchers examined the relation- 
ship between adoption and such variables as firm size, 
performance, functional differentiation, slack, and leader 
characteristics (e.g., Rosner, 1968; Moch and Morse, 1977; 
Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981). More recent empirical re- 
search has explored the role of macro-social factors in facili- 
tating the spread of innovations, some from an institutional 
perspective (e.g., Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings, 1986; Me- 
zias, 1990; Burns and Wholey, 1993). Institutional perspec- 
tives generally emphasize the role of social factors rather 
than economic or efficiency factors in driving organizational 
action, including external conformity pressures from regula- 
tory bodies or parent organizations, social pressures from 
other organizations with ties to the focal organization, as 
well as collective, social construction processes (e.g., Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Burns and Wholey, 1993; Scott, 1995). In 
institutional environments these normative pressures contrib- 
ute to isomorphism, or the emergence of common organiza- 
tional practices over time (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Sev- 
eral recent studies have demonstrated how 
interorganizational nd macro-social factors such as regula- 
tory pressure, as well as more traditional intraorganizational 
factors like performance, influence the likelihood of adopting 
organizational innovations (e.g., Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings, 
1986; Davis, 1991; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993). 
While researchers have made significant advances in identi- 
fying behavioral determinants of innovation adoption at both 
the organizational and macro-social levels, several important 
issues remain largely unexplored. First, researchers have 
typically treated innovation as a discrete phenomenon, ne- 
glecting to examine variation in the form of adoption itself or 
in implementation. While some innovations are inherently 
discrete (e.g., specific accounting practices or executive in- 
centive plans), most can vary appreciably in form. When the 
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particular definition or content of an innovation is open to 
interpretation, as in the case of such innovations as reengi- 
neering, matrix management, zero-based budgeting, or total 
quality management (TQM), variation in the form of adoption 
may be especially high, such that classifying adoption as an 
either-or proposition becomes somewhat arbitrary. In such 
cases, it may be more appropriate to explore how organiza- 
tions define and implement an innovation, rather than simply 
to predict whether organizations adopt at all. The importance 
of this issue is indicated by anecdotal evidence that the suc- 
cess of administrative innovations depends on how they are 
conceived and implemented (e.g., Lawler and Mohrman, 
1985). 
A second, unresolved issue concerns the role of interorgani- 
zational network ties in diffusion. In attempting to explain 
evidence that network connectedness can facilitate the 
spread of discrete innovations, organizational scholars have 
invoked theories ranging from vicarious learning driven by 
efficiency imperatives (Rogers, 1983; Mansfield, 1971) to 
*mimetic isomorphism resulting from social cohesion and 
conformity pressure (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966; Flig- 
stein, 1985; Burt, 1987; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993). 
There has been little attempt in the diffusion literature to de- 
termine when each of these divergent theoretical perspec- 
tives is most applicable in explaining the spread of informa- 
tion about an innovation across organizations. Network 
effects have typically been viewed as fixed and invariant; 
theorists have not considered how the content of informa- 
tion flowing through networks may change with time. 
A third, general shortcoming in the literature is that empirical 
tests of institutional processes have neglected to examine 
directly both economic and social consequences of adoption 
(Scott, 1995). Instead, studies have typically inferred the oc- 
currence of institutionalization from changes in the rate of 
adoption (e.g., Carroll and Hannan, 1989; Edelman, 1992) or 
from the decreased predictive power of certain organiza- 
tional factors over time (e.g., Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). As 
Scott (1995) noted, however, such residual effects do not 
necessarily capture institutional factors. For instance, the ef- 
ficiency or internal effectiveness concerns that drive early 
adoption may be replaced by a different, unmeasured set of 
determinants for later adopters. Moreover, increases in the 
rate of adoption or mimetic isomorphism may reflect social 
learning efficiencies rather than institutionalization (Rogers, 
1983; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). In the absence of 
direct measures of economic and social consequences of 
adopting innovations, multiple interpretations of observed 
trends and residual effects are possible. 
The present study addresses these issues by examining in- 
stitutional and network effects on innovation adoption in the 
context of total quality management (TQM) programs intro- 
duced by general medical surgical hospitals over the period 
1985 to 1993, a period of widespread diffusion of TQM 
among hospitals. TQM is defined here as a managerial inno- 
vation that emphasizes an organization's total commitment 
to the customer and to continuous improvement of every 
process through the use of data-driven, problem-solving ap- 
proaches based on empowerment of employee groups and 
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teams (Dean and Bowen, 1994). While TQM embodies a 
consistent management philosophy, the specific content or 
form of TQM adoption is open to interpretation, raising the 
potential for institutional effects in the development and 
implementation of TQM programs. We consider the potential 
for institutionalization in the form of TQM adoption, and we 
examine further how interorganizational network ties could 
moderate this process. We develop a contingency network 
perspective in which social network ties either facilitate cus- 
tomization of TQM in response to internal efficiency needs 
or promote conformity in response to external legitimacy 
pressures, depending on the stage of institutionalization and 
the attendant motivation for adoption. Moreover, our ap- 
proach develops a stronger test of institutional effects on 
organizational outcomes by addressing the consequences of 
conformity for both social legitimacy and economic effi- 
ciency. 
This paper also contributes to the growing empirical litera- 
ture on TQM. In one of the few large-sample, academic 
studies investigating the performance consequences of 
TQM, Powell (1995a) concluded that most organizational fea- 
tures commonly associated with TQM do not yield signifi- 
cant performance benefits. We offer a theoretical explana- 
tion for such findings: when TQM adoption is driven by 
conformity pressures rather than technical exigencies, firms 
may realize legitimacy benefits rather than technical perfor- 
mance benefits from adoption. To test this explanation, we 
simultaneously investigate both the performance conse- 
quences of innovation and the legitimacy benefits of con- 
formity by considering whether a transition occurred from 
one kind of benefit to another as the form of TQM became 
institutionalized. 
TQM As an Administrative Innovation in the 
Hospital Environment 
An innovation is defined as "any idea, practice or material 
artifact perceived to be new by the relevant unit of adop- 
tion" (Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek, 1973: 158). The ten- 
dency for researchers to conceive of innovation as a discrete 
phenomenon may derive from an emphasis in this literature 
on technological rather than administrative innovations (Dam- 
anpour, 1987). Whereas the presence or absence of techno- 
logical innovations is relatively unambiguous, the definition of 
administrative innovations is often open to multiple interpre- 
tations. Moreover, such innovations can potentially include 
many different routines that can be combined in different 
ways. Accordingly, in the case of administrative innovations, 
it is frequently difficult to determine conformity from adop- 
tion alone; it may be necessary to examine conformity in the 
form of the innovation adopted or how it is implemented, 
treating the adoption of such innovations as continuous 
rather than discrete occurrences. This is particularly true for 
TQM, which is a relatively complex, pervasive innovation de- 
signed to affect all parts of an organization. 
The TQM philosophy has four basic aspects (Anderson, 
Rungtusanatham, and Schroeder, 1994; Waldman, 1994). 
First, it has a customer focus. TQM emphasizes the im- 
provement of processes for both internal and external cus- 
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tomers. Internal customers include one's fellow workers, 
while external customers include not only those who pur- 
chase the good or service but also one's suppliers and other 
groups operating in the larger environment that influences 
the firm's success (e.g., regulatory bodies). Great attention is 
paid to identifying customer needs and expectations and 
then developing products and services that meet or exceed 
these expectations. Second, TQM emphasizes continuous 
improvement: it advocates a culture in which people are not 
satisfied with meeting current standards but, rather, push to 
exceed those standards. The emphasis is on raising stan- 
dards by comparing one's efforts with the best in the indus- 
try or in the world. Organizations adopting TQM reject the 
dictum, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." The new dictum be- 
comes, "If it ain't broke-break it!" if by doing so the pro- 
cess or product can be improved. At the heart of continuous 
improvement is the notion of the learning organization 
(Senge, 1990). Continuous improvement is achieved through 
constant experimentation, learning from mistakes and diffus- 
ing the learning throughout the organization. 
Third, TQM involves structured, problem-solving processes 
for identifying and solving problems and finding opportunities 
for improvement (Deming, 1993). These processes may in- 
clude such techniques and tools as cause-and-effect dia- 
grams, histograms, runs charts, pareto diagrams, statistical 
process control charts, and affinity diagrams (Hackman and 
Wageman, 1995). The common goal of these various prac- 
tices is to reduce systematic or common variance from qual- 
ity standards. Once the process is brought under control, 
attention then focuses on reexamining the process to see if 
it can be further improved through developing even tighter 
standards. 
Finally, TQM emphasizes employee empowerment. A major 
tenet of the TQM philosophy is that continuous improve- 
ment is most likely to occur with groups of individuals who 
are provided with not only knowledge, skills, and motivation 
but also with the authority to take action (Crosby, 1984). 
Most of the knowledge to improve a given product or ser- 
vice is thought to rest with those directly involved in produc- 
ing the good or service, and their knowledge must be 
tapped (Juran, 1989). This objective may be partially met 
through multifunctional, multidivisional teams trained in inter- 
personal skills and group processes. In general, while TQM 
can include many different policies and activities in different 
combinations, all TQM programs share the common objec- 
tive of channeling the organization's energy toward the cus- 
tomer (Anderson, Rungtusanatham, and Schroeder, 1994). 
Among extant administrative innovations, TQM seems a par- 
ticularly good one for studying social conformity in the form 
of innovation adoption. While little empirical evidence is 
available on the overall performance consequences of TQM, 
even less is known about the ideal form or content of TQM 
programs. As a result, decision makers face considerable 
uncertainty about which form of TQM adoption is most tech- 
nically efficient. For hospitals, added to this uncertainty are 
external accountability pressures (e.g., from the Joint Com- 
mission on Accreditation) to provide visible evidence of com- 
mitment to improved quality (Griffith, Sahney, and Mohr, 
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1995). Given that "uncertainty is a powerful force that en- 
courages imitation" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 151) and 
that normative pressure from accrediting agencies provides 
an additional incentive to conform (Scott, 1987), TQM adop- 
tion among hospitals represents an appropriate setting to 
study the operation of institutional processes. Further, recent 
evidence suggests that it is the implementation processes 
associated with TQM adoption that are most important for 
improving quality and performance outcomes in hospitals 
(Shortell, O'Brien, and Carman, 1995; Beyer, Ashmos, and 
Osborn, 1997). 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Customization and Conformity in TQM Adoption 
Organizational scholars suggest that institutionalization is a 
social process by which structures, policies, and programs 
acquire "rule-like status" as legitimate elements of the orga- 
nization (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341; Zucker, 1977, 1983). 
Most empirical studies trying to demonstrate institutionaliza- 
tion have inferred this process from the declining predictive 
power of certain organizational factors over time. For in- 
stance, Tolbert and Zucker (1983) proposed that early adop- 
tions of civil service reforms were motivated by technical or 
economic needs, while later adopters responded to the 
growing social legitimacy of these programs as taken-for- 
granted improvements in organizational structure. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, city characteristics predicted the likeli- 
hood of adoption among early adopters but not among later 
adopters. Similar findings have been obtained in studies in- 
vestigating the adoption of personnel programs (Baron, Dob- 
bin, and Jennings, 1986), the spread of city finance agencies 
(Meyer, Stevenson, and Webster, 1985), and the adoption of 
CEO incentive plans (Westphal and Zajac, 1994). As these 
and other administrative innovations become institutional- 
ized, their adoption becomes "in some measure beyond the 
discretion of any individual . . . organization" (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977: 344). 
Like many administrative innovations, TQM represents an 
integrated management philosophy (Powell, 1995a) rather 
than a clearly defined technology or set of techniques. From 
an institutional perspective it is quite feasible that TQM 
could invoke the socially legitimate goal of improving quality 
without dictating a well-defined routine for accomplishing it. 
For such administrative innovations, the appropriate question 
may not only be whether organizations adopt but how they 
adopt. Specifically, do hospitals develop TQM initiatives that 
conform to normative forms of TQM adoption, or do they 
customize TQM to the hospital's unique needs and capabili- 
ties? Conformity to normative adoption can involve, for in- 
stance, the selection of quality practices most commonly 
used by other adopters, or it can involve the adoption of 
standard and accepted approaches to TQM (e.g., Deming's, 
Crosby's, or Juran's). 
Adoption of an innovation could take several different forms. 
If organizations can minimize evaluation and inspection of 
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their internal operations by external constituents through 
adoption alone, they may neglect implementation altogether, 
decoupling operational routines from formally adopted pro- 
grams (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1981; 
Zajac and Westphal, 1995). In the adoption of ambiguous 
administrative innovations that involve actual inspection by 
an external agency at the level of operational routines, com- 
plete decoupling may not occur, and organizations may in- 
stead accommodate institutional demands by conforming to 
socially legitimate operational definitions of institutional 
goals. Oliver (1991: 152) described this response to institu- 
tional pressures as "acquiescence," in contrast to "avoid- 
ance." This scenario applies to many organizations in institu- 
tional environments in which external legitimating agencies 
may wield tight and intrusive controls (Scott and Meyer, 
1983; Scott, 1987). Among hospitals, external control over 
the adoption of TQM is exercised by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO), 
which regularly reviews the quality of care provided by hos- 
pitals by examining medical records, looking for documented 
evidence of certain quality improvement practices, and ob- 
serving whether hospitals use structures and policies such 
as quality improvement project teams and procedures for 
gathering and reviewing quality data. In addition to such co- 
ercive isomorphic pressures, there may be mimetic tenden- 
cies, resulting from uncertainty about which specific routines 
TQM actually comprises (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). To- 
gether, mimetic and coercive institutional processes can con- 
tribute to an emergent norm regarding the operational defini- 
tion of TQM or how it is implemented in the organization. 
Institutional theory suggests that this norm emergence pro- 
cess is built, ironically, on the efficiency motives of early 
adopters (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Zucker, 1983; Scott, 
1987). Hospitals perceiving manifest opportunities to im- 
prove performance with TQM programs should be the first 
to adopt. As the initial TQM adopters, seeking technical effi- 
ciency gains, customize their quality practices to the unique 
problems and opportunities facing their organizations, they 
fuel institutional isomorphic processes by prompting legiti- 
macy concerns among remaining nonadopters. Given that 
early adopters perceive more obvious opportunities for effi- 
ciency gains from TQM, their models of TQM adoption 
should be relatively successful, increasing normative pres- 
sure on remaining hospitals to-develop isomorphic programs 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Conversely, given that later 
adopters are less likely to have perceived an obvious way to 
adapt TQM to the organization's capabilities, they are more 
likely to imitate the models advanced by early adopters. 
Thus, institutional isomorphism is manifested empirically as 
increased conformity over time to normative TQM adoption. 
Accordingly, institutional forces affect not merely the deci- 
sion about whether to adopt TQM, as suggested by prior 
studies (e.g., Tolbert and Zucker, 1983), but also the deter- 
mination of what TQM is, or what it should comprise. This 
suggests the following, initial hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The later the date of TQM adoption, the greater 
the level of conformity to the normative pattern of quality practices 
introduced by other adopting organizations. 
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Network theorists have proposed that 
social networks can influence actors 
through both position- and cohesion- 
based mechanisms (for a review, see 
Marsden and Friedkin, 1993). Network 
theorists who focus on position suggest 
that networks provide a basis for social 
differentiation of firms into status groups 
based on their position and that firms are 
more likely to imitate others of similar 
status (e.g., Burt, 1987). In this study we 
focus on cohesion, which emphasizes 
information flows through network ties, 
rather than position, as the primary basis 
for network diffusion. 
Network Connectedness and Conformity in 
TQM Adoption 
Several researchers have examined how interorganizational 
and interpersonal relations affect the likelihood of adopting 
discrete innovations. Rogers (1983) argued that exposure to 
interpersonal channels of communication should promote 
early awareness of innovations, increasing the rate of adop- 
tion. This proposition is supported by a considerable body of 
research on innovation adoption and related studies examin- 
ing the effect of network ties on the decision making of indi- 
viduals or organizations. Social network ties to adopters have 
been shown to increase the likelihood of adopting medical 
technology and techniques (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 
1966; Becker, 1970), matrix management programs (Burns 
and Wholey, 1993), the multidivisional form (Palmer, Jen- 
nings, and Zhou, 1993), and poison pills (Davis, 1991).1 Addi- 
tional evidence suggests that firms are more likely to donate 
to specific charities or political action committees, engage in 
corporate acquisitions, or make other changes in corporate 
strategy or governance structure if decision makers have ties 
to leaders of other firms engaging in similar practices (Ga- 
laskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Mizruchi, 1992; Haun- 
schild, 1993; Gulati, 1995b; Westphal and Zajac, 1997). Fi- 
nally, a more diffuse literature on technology transfer 
provides considerable evidence that interorganizational rela- 
tionships or common governance structures facilitate the 
spread of particular innovations across organizations (e.g., 
Tushman, 1977; Darr, Argote, and Epple, 1995) or promote 
innovation in general (e.g., Shan, Walker, and Kogut, 1994). 
Interpretations of such findings vary widely (Abrahamson, 
1991). According to Levitt and March (1988: 330), communi- 
cation ties facilitate "a match between technology and orga- 
nization" by helping decision makers learn about innovations 
that fit unique organizational needs and opportunities (see 
also Mansfield, 1971; Rogers, 1983). By contrast, other theo- 
rists have suggested that communication ties encourage mi- 
metic isomorphism by informing decision makers about le- 
gitimate practices and possibly by exerting normative 
pressure toward conformity (e.g., Galaskiewicz and Wasser- 
man, 1989; Haunschild, 1993; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 
1993). While both perspectives conceive communication ties 
as a vehicle for social learning (Bandura, 1977), such learning 
promotes organizational efficiency in the former perspective 
and social legitimacy in the latter. 
Zucker's (1983) institutionalization thesis helps reconcile 
these potentially divergent interpretations of the relationship 
between social network ties and innovation adoption. Her 
primary claim is that the motivation for adopting organiza- 
tional structure shifts from internal, efficiency concerns to 
external, legitimacy concerns over time as the structure be- 
comes institutionalized. Applying this hypothesis to a net- 
work context, we expect that in later stages of the diffusion 
process, when innovations have acquired institutional status, 
communication ties could help disseminate information 
about legitimate forms of innovation adoption, while also 
possibly increasing normative pressure to conform to those 
practices. In earlier stages of the diffusion process, by con- 
trast, communication ties may help match innovations to or- 
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ganizations' unique efficiency needs. Thus, the content of 
information disseminated through network ties, and the re- 
sulting influence of networks on firm behavior, is contingent 
on the stage of institutionalization. This idea departs from 
prior network research in recognizing that network effects 
may not be constant over time. 
In the context of TQM adoption, social networks may influ- 
ence the form of practices adopting organizations introduce 
by informing decision makers about the normative form of 
TQM as it emerges over time. For initial TQM adopters, who 
are seeking efficiency gains from and face relatively minor 
institutional pressures, social ties to other adopters may fa- 
cilitate efforts to match or customize quality practices to the 
efficiency needs and opportunities facing their organizations. 
Social network ties may furnish an opportunity for early 
adopters to learn vicariously from the experience of other 
hospitals using TQM practices (Mansfield, 1971; Levitt and 
March, 1988; Huber, 1991). Such ties facilitate knowledge 
transfer about which quality practices satisfy specific organi- 
zational objectives and, perhaps more importantly, which 
practices exploit the focal organization's distinctive capabili- 
ties and resources. For early TQM adopters, therefore, net- 
work ties would promote customization rather than isomor- 
phism. As TQM becomes taken for granted or socially 
expected as an organizational policy, network ties can help 
organizations learn about the particular combination of prac- 
tices commonly recognized and accepted as TQM. In later 
stages of the diffusion process, therefore, network ties to 
other adopters should encourage conformity in the form of 
TQM adoption. 
Two kinds of network ties may be especially conducive to 
the transfer of knowledge about quality practices between 
hospitals: common membership in strategic alliances and 
multihospital systems. Alliances involve contractual arrange- 
ments between hospitals for the provision of goods and ser- 
vices, while systems bind hospitals together under common 
ownership. Hospital alliances and systems are frequently 
characterized by high levels of informal and formal communi- 
cation between member organizations (McKinney, Kaluzny, 
and Zuckerman, 1991; Gustafson and Hundt, 1995). The 
close, multiplex network ties afforded by alliance and system 
memberships facilitate the flow of information between hos- 
pitals connected to each other, which promotes mutual un- 
derstanding of each organization's distinctive capabilities and 
needs and increases the quality and relevance of advice 
from clinicians and executives of partner hospitals who have 
experience in developing TQM programs. The development 
of a common language between alliance or system mem- 
bers can further enhance the quality of communication 
(Zenger and Lawrence, 1989; Williams and Gibson, 1990), 
and trust and common interests afforded by social ties can 
enhance the willingness to provide it (Levitt and March, 
1988; Gulati, 1995a, 1995b). For early adopters, therefore, 
communications between alliance and system members 
should facilitate customization of TQM adoption to the hospi- 
tal's distinctive capabilities and weaknesses; for later adopt- 
ers, such communications should facilitate conformity to in- 
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stitutional pressures by raising awareness of normative TQM 
practices. This discussion suggests the following hypoth- 
eses: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The time of TQM adoption will interact with 
adoption by alliance partners to predict conformity in TQM adoption 
by the focal hospital. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Among late adopters, the greater the number 
of alliance partners having adopted TQM, the higher the level of 
conformity to the normative pattern of TQM adoption. 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Among early adopters, the greater the num- 
ber of alliance partners having adopted TQM, the lower the level of 
conformity to the normative pattern of TQM adoption. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The time of TQM adoption will interact with 
adoption by other system members to predict conformity in TQM 
adoption by the focal hospital. 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Among late adopters, the greater the number 
of other system members having adopted TQM, the higher the 
level of conformity to the normative pattern of TQM adoption. 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Among early adopters, the greater the num- 
ber of other system members having adopted TQM, the lower the 
level of conformity to the normative pattern of TQM adoption. 
The Consequences of Customization or Conformity in 
TQM Adoption 
As innovations become institutionalized as legitimate and 
expected elements of the organization, benefits from adop- 
tion may become increasingly social rather than economic or 
technical. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 141), 
"as an innovation spreads, a threshold is reached beyond 
which adoption provides legitimacy rather than improves 
technical performance" (see also Abrahamson, 1991: 588). 
As TQM acquires institutional status, quality practices will be 
evaluated by a "logic of social appropriateness" rather than a 
"logic of instrumentality" (Campbell, 1994: 7). Accordingly, 
later TQM adopters should experience both the benefits and 
costs of social conformity. While opportunities to customize 
quality practices are diminished, by conforming to normative 
TQM adoption an organization's quality program "[will] be 
taken for granted as legitimate, apart from evaluations of [its] 
impact on work outcomes" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 344). 
In contrast, the earliest adopters, motivated by the opportu- 
nity for efficiency gains and free from the "iron cage" of iso- 
morphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 147; Zucker, 
1983), should realize relatively higher performance gains by 
implementing quality practices that capitalize on their distinc- 
tive competencies and compensate for relative weaknesses. 
Prior empirical research has not directly examined this transi- 
tion from technical to social legitimacy benefits from innova- 
tion adoption. 
The importance of examining legitimacy versus technical 
benefits is particularly salient in studying TQM adoption be- 
cause, by focusing exclusively on the technical performance 
effects of adopting quality practices, prior studies in the 
TQM literature may have underspecified the social conse- 
quences of adoption. While evidence for performance ben- 
efits from TQM is mixed (Powell, 1995a), minimal or nega- 
tive performance effects do not necessarily imply that TQM 
fails to generate competitive advantage. Instead, organiza- 
tions experiencing negligible efficiency gains from TQM may 
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have effectively traded internal efficiency benefits for exter- 
nal legitimacy benefits by conforming to normative quality 
practices. This discussion leads to hypotheses on the conse- 
quences of conformity for legitimacy and performance: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Conformity by a hospital to the normative pat- 
tern of quality practices implemented by other TQM adopters will 
be positively associated with organizational legitimacy. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Conformity by a hospital to the normative pat- 
tern of quality practices implemented by other TQM adopters will 
be negatively associated with organizational efficiency. 
Overall, the hypotheses suggest that conformity to norma- 
tive TQM adoption should effectively mediate the relation- 
ship between time of adoption and the organizational conse- 
quences of adoption, such that the time of adoption should 
predict the degree of conformity, and conformity, in turn, 
should predict whether hospitals derive primarily efficiency 
or legitimacy benefits from adoption. 
METHOD 
Background on the Population 
The study population was all community general medical sur- 
gical hospitals in the period 1985-1993, a sample frame of 
5,492 organizations, 84 percent of which are not-for-profit. 
Widespread diffusion of TQM among these organizations 
began in 1989, but major changes had occurred in the health 
care environment prior to 1989. Perhaps the most prominent 
change occurred in 1983, when diagnostic related groups 
(DRGs) were introduced as a way to determine reimburse- 
ment rates for Medicare patients; this system imposed sig- 
nificant new efficiency pressures on hospitals. In the last 
few years (i.e., largely after the period of adoption examined 
here), hospitals have experienced more intense pressure 
from managed care providers to contain costs. 
Hospitals are embedded in larger networks through their 
memberships in alliances and systems. On average, a hospi- 
tal is involved in one alliance, and an alliance includes ap- 
proximately twenty hospitals. In general, alliances are region- 
ally based, extending across state boundaries. Alliance 
partners can engage in multiple activities, including in-house 
seminars, joint training of staff, cross-system improvement 
projects, institutes for clinical effectiveness, analyses of out- 
comes of care, and sharing of best practices, and these ac- 
tivities often involve multiple alliance members (McKinney, 
Kaluzny, and Zuckerman, 1991; Gustafson and Hundt, 1995; 
Kaluzny, Zuckerman, and Ricketts, 1995). The multiplex and 
multilateral ties among alliance members provide a rich ve- 
hicle for the exchange of information about quality practices 
(Greer, 1977). In-house seminars and joint training sessions 
provide opportunities for administrators, physicians, and 
nurses from different hospitals to discuss and exchange in- 
formation about the specific quality improvement tools and 
approaches (e.g., nominal group methods, brainstorming, 
control charts, etc.) used in their hospitals' TQM programs. 
These events give administrators and clinicians from differ- 
ent hospitals in an alliance the opportunity to form profes- 
sional relationships with each other, providing the basis for 
future information exchange. 
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There are approximately 300 hospital systems in the U.S., 
with an average of approximately nine hospitals per system. 
Research suggests that system ties typically facilitate the 
diffusion of innovations by reducing uncertainty and the risks 
associated with adoption, "helping [administrators] obtain 
important data on costs, problems, political risks, and innova- 
tion efficacy," "allowing potential adopters to learn from the 
experience of others," and creating group norms that favor 
adoption (McKinney, Kaluzny, and Zuckerman, 1991: 17-18). 
While innovations may be spread among members by virtue 
of a common, systemwide mandate, rather than through vol- 
untary information sharing and imitation, this more coercive 
mechanism is atypical (McKinney, Kaluzny, and Zuckerman, 
1991). For instance, the two largest systems in the dataset, 
the Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) and the American 
Medical International (AMI), made TQM voluntary for their 
member hospitals. 
Sample and Data Collection Instruments 
The data came from four sources: (1) the National Quality 
Survey, a focused survey of hospital quality improvement 
efforts; (2) the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health- 
care Organizations (JCAHO) national accreditation data; (3) 
financial performance data collected on a subsample of 300 
hospitals, provided by Health Care Investment Analysts 
(HCIA), which collects archival data on hospitals' financial 
and economic performance; and (4) data on hospital size and 
alliance and system membership obtained from the Annual 
Survey of Hospitals, conducted by the American Hospital 
Association. 
The National Quality Survey was sent by the hospital survey 
data center of the American Hospital Association in 1993 to 
the entire population of community general medical surgical 
hospitals (N = 5,492). The survey was completed by CEOs 
and top quality managers associated with 3,303 hospitals, 
representing a 60-percent return. Pretesting in 30 hospitals 
and discussion with industry experts had determined that 
the hospital's CEO and the hospital's top quality manager 
were the most knowledgeable and informed respondents to 
the questions. The survey asked for data on each hospital's 
quality improvement efforts, for example, time of adoption 
(overall and across specific practices), existence of quality 
improvement projects' teams, and use of quality improve- 
ment tools. The CEO was asked general questions on the 
hospital's overall quality improvement involvement, such as 
the existence of a quality improvement steering council, and 
the quality manager was asked more specific questions 
about TQM involvement, such as the use of particular quality 
improvement tools. Respondents were asked to indicate the 
impact of the quality improvement efforts on organizational 
efficiency. 
We merged the survey data with each hospital's most re- 
cent (to 1993) accreditation data from the JCAHO, which is a 
national voluntary accreditation agency established in 1951 
by the American College of Surgeons, the American College 
of Physicians, the American Dental Association, the Ameri- 
can Hospital Association, and the American Medical Associa- 
tion to assess and improve the quality of care in U.S. hospi- 
tals. The JCAHO reviews the quality of care provided in U.S. 
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hospitals and other health care organizations based on the 
extent to which they meet established standards in 49 ar- 
eas, including medical staff, quality assessment and im- 
provement, medical record-keeping, nursing care, laboratory 
services, and hospital governance and management func- 
tions. 
Merging the two data sets yielded complete data for 2,712 
hospitals. There were no differences between this sample 
and the larger population across any of the independent or 
dependent measures obtained from the separate archival 
sources (including the AHA data), except that hospitals in our 
sample were slightly more likely to be members of hospital 
systems (39 percent vs. 35 percent). The rate of TQM adop- 
tion among hospitals in our sample is close to the adoption 
rate for the population (73 percent vs. 70 percent). The 
3-percent difference does not affect the findings discussed 
below, however, because our analysis is limited to those 
hospitals that have adopted TQM, while controlling for any 
possible sample selection bias using the Heckman selection 
model. 
Finally, we obtained historical archival data on hospital per- 
formance, liquidity, slack resources, and cost control from 
Health Care Investment Analysts (HCIA) for a random sub- 
sample of 300 hospitals. Complete data were available for 
269 of the 300 hospitals. Separate analyses and summary 
data from HCIA confirmed that this subsample is representa- 
tive of the population across the independent and dependent 
measures. 
Dependent Measures 
Conformity. To measure conformity to the normative, or 
typical, pattern of TQM adoption, the survey first asked re- 
spondents to indicate whether their hospital had engaged in 
twenty different quality practices, which cover the range of 
interventions that have been implemented in TQM programs 
in hospitals (Berwick, Godfrey, and Roessner, 1990; Bars- 
ness et al., 1993). These practices include (1) various kinds 
of team structures (e.g., quality improvement councils), (2) 
statistical tools and process heuristics (e.g., control charts, 
pareto diagrams, cause-and-effect diagrams), (3) training, (4) 
quality reports, and (5) benchmarking (see Appendix for com- 
plete list). All are discussed in the literature as possible kinds 
of TQM interventions (e.g., Waldman, 1994; Hackman and 
Wageman, 1995; Powell, 1995a). We measured conformity 
by coding whether a hospital used a particular practice, then 
calculating the percentage of other hospitals adopting TQM 
in the same or earlier time period whose response (i.e., 
use/do not use) matched the focal hospital's response. We 
then summed these percentages across the twenty prac- 
tices, yielding an overall measure of conformity (conformity 
measure 1). 
For a subset of 45 hospitals we were able to examine the 
test-retest reliability of assessments about the use of indi- 
vidual quality practices from responses to an earlier survey. 
This subsample was representative of the larger sample in 
terms of hospital size, efficiency, legitimacy, and the use or 
nonuse of individual quality practices. We measured consis- 
tency in the responses by calculating kappa coefficients for 
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each practice, a procedure that corrects for the amount of 
consistency over time expected by chance. Coefficients 
were significant for all twenty practices; the lowest level of 
consistency was 95.6 percent, and the average consistency 
was 97.8 percent. These high levels of reliability are not sur- 
prising, in that the questions elicit relatively objective, fact- 
based information, rather than subjective information about 
attitudes. 
A separate measure of conformity asked respondents 
whether their hospital followed a particular, standard TQM 
approach-those of Crosby, Deming, or Juran, widely recog- 
nized leaders of the total quality movement who created dis- 
tinct approaches to TQM. Deming's approach emphasizes 
statistical tools and process heuristics, Crosby's focuses on 
training, and Juran's emphasizes quality audits (Crosby, 
1984; Juran, 1989; Deming, 1993; Waldman, 1994; Hackman 
and Wageman, 1995). Respondents were asked whether 
they followed (1) one of these approaches, (2) a combination 
of one or more of these approaches, (3) some other, non- 
standard approach, or (4) no particular approach. TQM pro- 
grams that fall in the latter three categories can be viewed 
as more customized than programs that conform to a single, 
standard approach. The three standard approaches to TQM 
can be considered preexisting scripts available to guide 
implementation. By combining approaches, hospitals were 
customizing their TQM program, adding or subtracting fea- 
tures to suit their needs. This second measure of conformity 
was coded 1 if hospitals used a particular, standard TQM 
model (category 1 above), and 0 otherwise (conformity mea- 
sure 2). The correlation between the two conformity mea- 
sures was .54, providing initial evidence for reliability. We 
nevertheless conducted two separate sets of analyses using 
each of these measures; the results are presented sepa- 
rately below. 
Efficiency and legitimacy. We defined efficiency broadly, as 
institutional theorists have, and use the term synonymously 
with "organizational performance" and "the internal function- 
ing of the organization" (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983: 26; see 
also Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer, Scott, and Deal, 
1983). We used multiple measures of efficiency. The first 
measure assessed the perceived impact of TQM on costs, 
the frequency of errors and inappropriate treatment, hospital- 
physician relations, physician, nurse, and staff turnover, and 
patient satisfaction (perceived efficiency). This measure 
gauges the perceived effect of TQM on processes that af- 
fect efficiency. The reliability of this scale was satisfactory 
(alpha = .88), and factor analysis with principal factors esti- 
mation and varimax rotation confirmed that all items loaded 
on a single factor (estimated using the Bartlett method). 
We also used two archival measures of hospital perfor- 
mance: return on equity (ROE) and the number of full-time 
equivalent employees (FTEs) per 100 admissions, calculated 
for the year following TQM adoption. ROE gauges profitabil- 
ity, and the second measure assesses productivity. Return 
on equity is a meaningful measure of performance for all 
hospitals in the sample, including not-for-profits, since the 
distinction between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals is 
largely a legal one having to do with the distribution of re- 
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tained earnings. The archival measures were positively corre- 
lated with the survey measure (.53 and .48 for productivity 
and profitability, respectively) and with each other (.44), pro- 
viding evidence for convergent validity. Nevertheless, the 
results are presented separately below for each measure. 
We measured hospital legitimacy with the overall JCAHO 
rating, which ranges from 0 (no compliance) to 100 (perfect 
compliance) and is calculated as a composite of 83 individual 
scores, measured as 1 = substantial compliance; 2 = signifi- 
cant; 3 = partial; 4 = minimal; and 5 = no compliance. (In 
separate models, we applied a logistic transformation of the 
legitimacy measure, and the results discussed below were 
substantively unchanged.) Based on this overall evaluation, 
JCAHO accredits organizations achieving acceptable levels of 
performance. Accreditation imparts significant institutional 
legitimacy because it is a condition of hospital participation in 
the Federal Medicare Program and many state Medicaid pro- 
grams. Scott (1987: 502) specifically cites the JCAHO as a 
source of institutional pressure on hospitals, and several au- 
thors have noted the significant impact of the JCAHO's 
monitoring and evaluation process on total quality practices 
(Lathrop, 1993: 29; Ziegenfuss, 1993: 20). The JCAHO did 
not change its standards or procedure for accreditation dur- 
ing our period of study. 
Independent Measures 
Time of adoption. TQM was first adopted by health care 
organizations in the late 1980s, largely in response to pres- 
sure from employers, purchasers, and payers to provide 
more cost-effective health care (Berwick, Godfrey, and 
Roessner, 1989, 1990; Laffel and Blumenthal, 1989). As 
shown in Figure 1, widespread diffusion began in 1989, fol- 
lowing a large-scale, national demonstration program spon- 
sored by private health care foundations (Berwick, Godfrey, 
and Roessner, 1989). The time of TQM adoption (late adop- 
tion) was divided into three categories: within two years, be- 
tween two and four years previous, and more than four 
years previous to data collection in 1993. This time variable 
effectively divides early and late adopters at approximately 
the midpoint of the observed adoption period, with an addi- 
tional category for the relatively few hospitals that adopted 
prior to the period of widespread adoption. In separate analy- 
ses, we operationalized time of adoption as a dichotomous 
variable by excluding hospitals that adopted more than four 
years previously (i.e., omitting category three), and the re- 
sults reported below were substantively unchanged. We also 
operationalized time of adoption as the year in which one or 
more specific TQM practices were introduced. Again, the 
results were substantively unchanged, suggesting that our 
findings do not depend on one particular measure of time of 
adoption. 
Network ties. We measured ties to alliance partners who 
had adopted TQM (alliance ties to adopters) as a count vari- 
able equal to the number of alliance partners who adopted 
TQM prior to the focal firm. Ties to fellow system members 
who had adopted TQM (system ties to adopters) were mea- 
sured in the same way. Both measures include ties to other 
hospitals adopting prior to the focal hospital, even for those 
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Figure 1. The cumulative adoption of TQM among general medical sur- 
gical hospitals. 
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adopting in the same category of adoption period (e.g., for 
hospitals adopting in 1992 we included ties to hospitals 
adopting in 1991, even though both years are classified as 
late adoption). 
We used the product term approach to assess the interac- 
tive effect of these network variables and late adoption on 
TQM conformity. First, to avoid any possible multicollinearity 
problem, all three variables were centered (Jaccard, Turrisi, 
and Wan, 1990). Although one study suggests that this 
transformation is unnecessary (Harrison and Mitchell, 1995), 
a clear consensus on this issue has not emerged. Because 
the centering procedure at best alleviates multicollinearity 
problems and at worst makes no difference, we elected to 
use it here. We created interaction terms as the product of 
each network variable and the time of adoption (alliance 
ties x late adoption and system ties x late adoption). 
Control variables. We included several control variables in 
the analyses. We controlled for technological sophistication, 
measured by the number of high-technology services offered 
(trauma, stereostatic radiology, MRI, PET scanner, kidney 
transplant, organ transplant, thyroid transplant, bone marrow 
transplant), because such services are costly and therefore 
might provide hospitals with a greater impetus to adopt 
TQM for technical efficiency purposes. We used principal 
components to create an index of technical services offered 
(Jackson, 1991). 
Given that market competition may provide an additional im- 
petus toward isomorphism (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 
1993), while also potentially affecting performance outcomes 
(Reed, Lemak, and Montgomery, 1996), we included a mea- 
sure of competitive pressure (competition) in all models by 
combining four survey items measuring competition into a 
single factor using principal components factor analysis. The 
scree test and factor loadings confirmed that all four items 
loaded on a single factor. Specific items assessed the num- 
ber of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the same 
market area, the percentage of all patients for which the 
hospital is paid on a per-capita basis, the number of hospitals 
that are direct competitors of the focal hospital, and the per- 
ceived intensity of competition. In addition, because isomor- 
phic tendencies and legitimacy pressures may be associated 
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with organizational size (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152; 
Carroll and Hannan, 1989), we also included hospital size, 
measured as the total number of staffed beds. 
We constructed additional control measures of hospital per- 
formance and certain organizational characteristics for the 
representative subsample of 269 hospitals. Since hospitals 
facing organizational inefficiencies or poor economic condi- 
tions are more likely to seek efficiency benefits from TQM, 
hospital productivity and profitability may be related to both 
the time of TQM adoption and the degree of conformity. 
Thus, we developed control variables for hospital profitability, 
measured as return on equity, and hospital productivity, 
measured as the number of full-time equivalent employees 
per 100 admissions (FTEs/I00 admissions). We also con- 
trolled for organizational slack, measured as the hospital's 
administrative expenses as a percentage of total expenses 
(percent administrative expenses), because organizations 
with more abundant resources may be better able to experi- 
ment with new forms of TQM (cf. Cyert and March, 1963; 
Nohria and Gulati, 1995), making it easier to customize their 
TQM programs. Similarly, because hospitals enjoying high 
liquidity may also have a greater capacity for customization, 
we controlled for liquidity, using the prior debt service cover- 
age ratio (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988). 
Finally, we used prior case mix expense per day as a mea- 
sure of cost control, given that hospitals with inadequate 
cost control may tend to seek efficiency benefits from TQM 
adoption. This measure was calculated as the total number 
of outpatient visits, divided by inpatient admissions, and ad- 
justed for the average severity of cases treated at the hospi- 
tal. Higher values signify lower cost control. All five control 
variables were calculated for the year prior to the year of 
TQM adoption. Table 1 provides the means, standard devia- 
tions, and bivariate correlations for all hospitals in the 
sample. Note that we did not control for whether. hospitals 
were designated as not-for-profit rather than for-profit, be- 
cause both groups have experienced strong external pres- 
sures to adopt quality practices; nevertheless, in separate 
analyses we included a control variable indicating not-for- 
profit vs. for-profit status, and the results presented below 
were substantively unchanged. 
Analysis 
To analyze each dependent variable of interest (i.e., conform- 
ity in TQM adoption and the consequences for organizational 
legitimacy and performance), we used the Heckman selec- 
tion model, a two-staged procedure that corrects for sample 
selection bias in regression analysis (Heckman, 1979; Mad- 
dala, 1983). Given that conformity to normative quality prac- 
tices is limited to firms that have adopted TQM, sample se- 
lection bias could threaten the generalizability of our results. 
For example, if hospitals that adopt TQM programs are more 
sensitive to institutional pressures or are better positioned to 
realize legitimacy benefits from conformity than non-adopt- 
ers, then specification error would be present. 
The Heckman selection model includes two equations: the 
first equation predicts whether or not an observation is ob- 
served, and the second equation predicts the outcome of 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients* 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Conformity measure 1 7.182 2.473 
2. Conformity measure 2 .423 .494 .54 
3. Late adoption 1.306 .541 .23 .20 
4. Alliance ties to adopters 11.199 28.528 .04 .03 .17 
5. System ties to adopters 6.104 15.146 .01 .02 .16 -.15 
6. Alliance ties x time of adop. 1.101 18.400 .22 .20 .20 .19 .01 
7. System ties x time of adop. .381 9.884 .20 .19 .20 .01 .20 -.09 
8. Number of beds 230.041 200.483 .11 .12 .13 .22 -.09 .02 -.01 
9. Competition .000 .982 .06 .03 -.06 .05 .01 -.04 .03 .30 
10. Technological sophistication .000 1.000 -.04 -.08 -.26 -.12 .03 -.01 .01 -.39 
11. Perceived efficiency .000 .863 -.15 -.17 -.25 .07 .02 -.17 -.16 .22 
12. Organizational legitimacy 82.847 8.338 .26 .27 .31 -.06 .02 .13 .11 -.21 
13. Return on equity 10.155 46.053 -.18 -.27 -.29 .05 .02 -.19 -.16 .18 
14. FTEs/100 admissionst 5.832 1.499 -.21 -.25 -.34 .03 -.01 -.22 -.27 .25 
15. Prior return on equity 10.428 50.823 .15 .16 -.13 -.06 -.1 0 .06 .08 -.02 
16. Prior % admin. expenses 10.594 3.188 -.09 -.10 -.14 -.06 .04 .07 -.05 -.25 
17. Prior FTEs/100 admissions 5.534 1.454 -.16 -.18 .10 -.04 -.06 .05 .08 .12 
18. Prior case mix expense/day 516.273 164.262 -.18 -.18 -.12 -.08 -.03 .07 .02 -.09 
19. Prior debt service coverage ratio 2.285 2.553 .04 .02 -.06 -.04 -.04 .01 .02 .05 
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
10. Technological sophistication -.25 
11. Perceived efficiency .19 -.20 
12. Organizational legitimacy -.14 .18 -.01 
13. Return on equity .04 .02 .48 -.13 
14. FTEs/100 admissionst .15 .06 .53 -.16 .44 
15. Prior return on equity -.08 .07 .37 .04 .41 .28 
16. Prior % admin. expenses -.07 .18 -.15 -.13 -.09 -.12 .16 
17. Prior FTEs/1 00 admissions -.06 -.13 -.1 0 .04 .22 .39 -.06 .06 
18. Prior case mix expense/day -.05 .03 .11 .12 -.07 -.08 -.04 .39 .20 
19. Prior debt service coverage ratio .03 -.03 .06 -.05 .10 .06 .02 .00 .23 .08 
*N = 1979 for variables 1-1 1 and 193 for variables 12-19. All correlations involving variables 12-19 reflect the smaller 
sample size. 
tFor the bivariate correlations, values for this measure are subtracted from the highest value in the sample so that 
higher values reflect greater productivity; descriptives reflect actual values. 
interest. In this case, the latter equation represents conform- 
ity in TQM practices while the former represents the likeli- 
hood of TQM adoption. When the error terms from these 
equations are significantly correlated, standard regression 
techniques applied to the second equation alone can yield 
biased results. In other words, to the extent that error terms 
in both equations contain some common omitted variables, 
selection bias will occur (van de Ven and van Praag, 1981). 
Heckman's procedure generates consistent, asymptotically 
efficient estimates for such models, allowing us to general- 
ize to the larger population of hospitals (Heckman, 1979). 
The model first estimates the likelihood of TQM adoption 
with probit regression. The index function from the probit 
model is transformed into a hazard rate using the Mills ratio, 
and the estimated rate is then included in a second-stage 
regression model to predict conformity for those hospitals 
that have adopted. For the second measure of conformity, 
which is dichotomous rather than continuous, the second 
stage model is estimated with bivariate probit regression 
(van de Ven and van Praag, 1981). 
We constructed two sets of Heckman models: the first set 
predicted conformity, legitimacy, and performance for the 
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full sample of 2,712 hospitals, and the second set included 
the additional control variables for the representative sub- 
sample of 269 hospitals (193 adopters). In all of these mod- 
els the first equation predicts TQM adoption. We also con- 
ducted separate analyses using Cochrane-Orcutt regression 
to ensure that estimates were not biased by serial correla- 
tion (Johnston, 1984); results for the hypothesized relation- 
ships were substantively unchanged from the results re- 
ported below. 
RESULTS 
Table 2 provides results for the Heckman selection models 
of conformity in TQM adoption, using the two different mea- 
sures of conformity. Models 1 and 2 predict conformity to 
the normative pattern of adoption, as determined by the use 
or non-use of twenty different quality structures and prac- 
tices (conformity measure 1), and models 3 and 4 predict 
conformity to a standard, legitimate TQM model (conformity 
measure 2). The second model of each pair includes addi- 
tional control variables for the random subsample of 269 
hospitals. 
The results for models 1 and 3 support hypothesis 1, that 
Table 2 
Heckman Sample Selection Models of Conformity in TQM Adoption* 
Conformity Measure 1 Conformity Measure 2 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Late adoption .225- .802- .167--- .534- 
(.093) (.317) (.064) (.206) 
Alliance ties to adopters .001 .002 .001 .002 
(.001) (.004) (.001) (.002) 
System ties to adopters .0001 -.008 -.001 -.003 
(.002) (.010) (.002) (.006) 
Alliance ties x late adoption .007. .01 3- .004 .009 
(.002) (.006) (.001) (.004) 
System ties x late adoption .010-- .051-- .006-- .037. 
(.004) (.019) (.002) (.012) 
Number of beds .001- .002- .0007 .002- 
(.0005) (.001) (.0004) (.0007) 
Competition .059 .191 .018 .132 
(.040) (.129) (.028) (.087) 
Technological sophistication -.005 -.088 -.009 -.104 
(.034) (.118) (.023) (.078) 
Prior return on equity .01 5- .131- 
(.007) (.053) 
Prior percent administrative expenses -.064 -.058 
(.057) (.038) 
Prior FTEs/1 00 admissions -.339 -.209- 
(.124) (.085) 
Prior case mix expense per day -.002- -.002- 
(.001) (.001) 
Prior debt service coverage ratio .051 .125 
(.086) (.114) 
Constant 2.710--- 7.534 .434 1.329 
(.343) (1.483) (.241) (1.011) 
Chi-square 69.94- 40.82--- 52.86--- 37.40. 
Pseudo R-square .34 .43 .31 .41 
Rho (p) .51 .54 .49 .50 
N 2712 269 2712 269 
*p s .05; p s .01; p s .001; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
* Unstandardized coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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later adopters would be more likely than early adopters to 
conform to the normative pattern of quality practices intro- 
duced by other adopting organizations. After controlling for 
the significant effect of hospital size on conformity, as well 
as the effect of competition and technological sophistication, 
time of TQM adoption is positively and significantly related 
to both measures of conformity in the form of TQM adop- 
tion. Moreover, using a separate survey question that asked 
respondents to indicate when a subset of specific quality 
practices were introduced, we constructed a separate mea- 
sure of conformity and found that the results were substan- 
tively unchanged. Thus, the observed relationship between 
time of adoption and conformity cannot be attributed to early 
adopters customizing their TQM programs over time. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted an interaction effect between the 
prevalence of adoption among other alliance partners and 
the time of adoption on the degree of conformity in TQM 
adoption. Specifically, we predicted that for late adopters, 
the greater the number of alliance partners having adopted 
TQM, the higher the level of conformity to the normative 
pattern of TQM adoption, while for early adopters, ties to 
prior adopters would be negatively related to conformity. The 
results shown in Table 2 provide strong support for this hy- 
pothesized interaction. The consistently significant coeffi- 
cients for "alliance ties to adopters x late adoption" indicate 
that the positive relationship between time of adoption and 
Table 3 
Heckman Sample Selection Models of Hospital Legitimacy* 
Unstandarized Coefficients 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Conformity measure 1 .064- .209--- 
(.019) (.065) 
Conformity measure 2 .383--- .648--- 
(.068) (.263) 
Late adoption .067 .176 .057 .172 
(.064) (.221) (.063) (.224) 
Number of beds .001- .001 .001-- .001 
(.0004) (.0008) (.0004) (.0008) 
Competition -.033 -.126 -.033 - .130 
(.029) (.092) (.028) (.094) 
Technological sophistication -.014 -.135 -.013 -.138 
(.024) (.081) (.023) (.081) 
Prior return on equity .001 .001 
(.003) (.003) 
Prior percent administrative expenses -.084 -.091- 
(.038) (.039) 
Prior FTEs/1 00 admissions .089 .091 
(.086) (.083) 
Prior case mix expense per day .0006 .0005 
(.0009) (.0009) 
Prior debt service coverage ratio -.039 -.043 
(.052) (.051) 
Constant 1.073--- 2.256- 1.041--- 2.327- 
(.254) (1.056) (.249) (1.032) 
Chi-square 59.38--- 33.82--- 61.25--- 27.34- 
Pseudo R-square .25 .35 .26 .32 
Rho (p) .55 .57 .55 .57 
N 2712 269 2712 269 
*p s .05; p 0 . 1; p < .001; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
*- Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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conformity increases significantly as alliance ties to other 
adopters increases. Moreover, analysis of simple effects 
confirmed that the coefficient for alliance ties is negatively 
related to conformity for early adopters (i.e., firms adopting 
two or more years previously) and positively related to con- 
formity for late adopters (i.e., firms adopting within two 
years), across both measures of conformity. . 
A similar pattern of results in Table 2 supports hypothesis 3: 
for both measures of conformity, system ties to other adopt- 
ers significantly increased the positive relationship between 
time of adoption and the degree of conformity in TQM adop- 
tion. Together with the insignificant main effect for system 
ties (and unreported simple effects that mirror those for alli- 
ance ties), these results show that system ties to other 
adopters decrease conformity for early adopters and in- 
crease conformity for later adopters. Overall, network con- 
nectedness to other TQM adopters encourages conformity 
to normative quality practices among later adopters, while 
discouraging conformity (i.e., promoting customization) 
among early adopters. These findings do not appear to result 
from differences in the attributes of hospitals to which early 
and late adopters are connected. The networks of early 
adopters do not differ from those of late adopters in terms 
of the prevalence of teaching hospitals, average hospital 
size, geographic region, or average technological sophistica- 
Table 4 
Heckman Sample Selection Models of Hospital Legitimacy* 
Perceived Efficiency 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Conformity measure 1 -.032- -.1 53- . - 
(.015) (.050) 
Conformity measure 2 -.143- -.687--- 
(.055) (.209) 
Late adoption -.386--- -.681--- -.386--- -.700. 
(.054) (.209) (.054) (.203) 
Number of beds .002--- .001- .002--- .001- 
(.0003) (.0007) (.0003) (.0007) 
Competition .082- . - .119 .082- . - .129 
(.024) (.084) (.024) (.083) 
Technological sophistication .016 .039 .016 .049 
(.023) (.084) (.023) (.084) 
Prior return on equity .012--- .012--- 
(.003) (.003) 
Prior percent administrative expenses .012 .019 
(.036) (.036) 
Prior FTEs/100 admissions -.150- -.149- 
(.074) (.073) 
Prior case mix expense per day .001 .001 
(.0007) (.0007) 
Prior debt service coverage ratio .052 .044 
(.069) (.067) 
Constant .991- - - .353 .979. .320 
(.229) (.938) (.214) (.877) 
Chi-square 96.03--- 107.26"- 99.08--- 104.13--- 
Pseudo R-square .40 .52 .42 .52 
Rho (p) .47 .50 .47 .49 
N 2712 269 2712 269 
*p s .05; p s .01; p s .001; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
* Unstandardized coefficients are reported; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
Heckman Sample Selection Models of Hospital Legitimacy (N = 269)* 
FTEs/100 Admissionst Return on Equity 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Conformity measure 1 -.079 -2.115- 
(.039) (.963) 
Conformity measure 2 -.429- -9.627- 
(.161) (3.899) 
Late adoption -.305 -.339* -8.363- -8.463- 
(.144) (.144) (3.533) (3.491) 
Number of beds .001- .001- .013 .013 
(.0005) (.0005) (.013) (.013) 
Competition .012 .015 1.272 1.368 
(.060) (.061) (1.465) (1.465) 
Technological sophistication .098 .104 2.609 2.605 
(.054) (.055) (1.327) (1.336) 
Prior return on equity .009 .009 .322--- .347--- 
(.004) (.004) (.086) (.093) 
Prior % admin. expenses -.032 -.032 -1.114 -1.020 
(.027) (.027) (.657) (.655) 
Prior FTEs/100 admissionst .559 .562" -2.858 -2.731 
(.060) (.060) (1.459) (1.455) 
Prior case mix expense per day -.0005 -.0005 -.019 -.018 
(.0006) (.0006) (.014) (.014) 
Prior debt service coverage ratio .070 .070 1.028 1 .029 
(.040) (.040) (1.009) (1.009) 
Constant 2.457--- 2.978--- 2.547--- 2.797--- 
(.708) (.671) (.761) (.749) 
Chi-square 123.72--- 118.20--- 1 14.34- 107.72--- 
Pseudo R-square .61 .59 .57 .54 
Rho (p) .49 .49 .45 .46 
p ? .05; p s .01; p s .001; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
* Unstandardized coefficients are reported; standard errors are in parentheses. 
t Values for this measure are subtracted from the highest value in the sample so that higher values reflect greater 
productivity. 
tion. The results are also not driven by universal mandates 
imposed by large systems on their members. Separate 
analyses showed that, when the system tie variable was set 
to zero for members of either of the two largest systems or 
for members of the five largest systems, the results were 
substantively unchanged. Finally, given that states have not 
mandated the adoption of TQM practices, the results also 
cannot be an artifact of common location in particular states. 
The results for models 2 and 4 in Table 2 indicate that the 
hypothesized effects remain significant after controlling for 
prior hospital profitability (return on assets), productivity 
(FTEs/1 00 admissions), slack (percent administrative ex- 
penses), liquidity (debt service coverage ratio), and cost con- 
trol (case mix expense per day). 
Table 3 provides results for the Heckman selection model of 
hospital legitimacy. The results for models 1 and 3 show 
that, consistent with hypothesis 4, both measures of con- 
formity in TQM adoption are positively associated with hos- 
pital legitimacy. Although time of adoption has a strong ef- 
fect on legitimacy when conformity is excluded from the 
models (p < .0001, not displayed), this relationship disap- 
pears when either measure of conformity is added, as indi- 
cated by the results in Table 3. This suggests that the rela- 
tionship between time of adoption and legitimacy is largely 
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mediated by conformity to the normative pattern of imple- 
mentation (Baron and Kenny, 1986). The effect of conformity 
on legitimacy remains strongly significant after including ad- 
ditional control variables in models 2 and 4. Neither profitabil- 
ity nor productivity is significantly related to legitimacy for 
hospitals in this sample. 
Results for Heckman selection models of hospital efficiency 
are provided in Tables 4 and 5. Models using the survey 
measure of efficiency are provided in Table 4, and models 
using the two archival measures are provided in Table 5. The 
results furnish consistent support for hypothesis 5: conform- 
ity to normative TQM adoption is significantly and negatively 
related to hospital efficiency, for both measures of conform- 
ity and all three measures of efficiency. This effect remains 
significant after controlling for prior performance and other 
organizational characteristics. Given that the results hold for 
archival measures of performance, as well as the survey 
measure, they cannot be attributed to response biases (e.g., 
variation in enthusiasm for TQM among the respondents) 
that might be related to conformity in adoption. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results provide strong support for the proposed theoreti- 
cal framework on the adoption of administrative innovations. 
In comparison to early adopters, later adopters of TQM pro- 
grams conformed more closely to the normative pattern of 
quality practices introduced by other adopting hospitals. This 
result extends prior research on institutionalization by dem- 
onstrating increased conformity over time in the form or 
definition of innovation adoption, rather than in the overall 
decision to adopt. The findings are consistent with the view 
that early adopters, motivated by technical efficiency gains 
from adoption (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983), are more likely to 
customize quality practices to the organization's unique 
needs and capabilities. In contrast, later adopters, experienc- 
ing normative pressure to adopt legitimate quality practices, 
appear more likely to mimic the normative model or defini- 
tion of TQM adoption implemented in other hospitals. In this 
way, external social pressures have contributed to isomor- 
phism in the form of TQM programs (Scott, 1987; cf. DiMag- 
gio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1983). 
The second set of findings, which address the impact of so- 
cial network ties on institutionalization, provided consistent 
evidence for a contingent network effect in the form and 
consequences of innovation adoption. Network ties de- 
creased conformity to normative TQM adoption for early 
adopters and increased conformity for late adopters. More- 
over, this pattern of results held for two different kinds of 
social network tie: common membership in a strategic alli- 
ance and membership in the same hospital system. 
While several studies have established that network ties to 
adopters can increase the likelihood of adopting discrete in- 
novations (e.g., Becker, 1970; Burns and Wholey, 1993; 
Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993), theorists have offered 
divergent and seemingly conflicting interpretations of such 
findings, variously attributing network effects to vicarious 
learning driven by efficiency imperatives (e.g., Mansfield, 
1971) or, more recently, to mimetic isomorphism (e.g., 
Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993). By showing how net- 
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work processes may be moderated by the degree of institu- 
tionalization, our study may help reconcile these different 
perspectives. Our findings suggest that in the early stages of 
the institutionalization process, when institutional forces are 
limited, social network ties may facilitate "a match between 
technology and organization" (Levitt and March, 1988: 330) 
by helping decision makers identify which specific TQM 
practices exploit the focal organization's distinctive capabili- 
ties and resources and which practices promote the hospi- 
tal's strategic objectives. By contrast, the findings also indi- 
cate that at later stages of the institutionalization process, 
network ties to other adopters facilitate conformity rather 
than customization of TQM adoption. It appears, consistent 
with both institutional and network perspectives, that social 
networks expedite mimetic isomorphism by disseminating 
knowledge about the normative form of TQM adoption as it 
emerges over time. Thus, the results may have important 
implications for the literature on interorganizational networks, 
which has viewed network effects as unchanging over time 
(Burkhardt and Brass, 1990, is an important exception). 
The third set of results pertained to the organizational conse- 
quences of relative conformity in TQM adoption. Consistent 
with our hypotheses, conformity to normative TQM adoption 
was negatively associated with organizational efficiency ben- 
efits (across three different measures of efficiency) and posi- 
tively associated with organizational egitimacy benefits from 
adoption. Relative conformity largely mediated the effect of 
time of adoption on legitimacy and efficiency, such that early 
versus late adoption affected hospital outcomes largely 
through its effect on conformity. While early adopters, recog- 
nizing greater opportunity for efficiency gains and free from 
isomorphic pressures, enjoy greater technical benefits from 
TQM by customizing quality practices to their organization's 
unique capabilities and needs, later adopters trade organiza- 
tional efficiency benefits for legitimacy benefits by conform- 
ing to isomorphic pressures. While prior empirical research 
has not directly examined both the social and economic con- 
sequences of institutional processes, the present finding is 
consistent with recent studies in the organizational impres- 
sion management literature suggesting that displays of con- 
formity to institutional norms can yield significant legitimacy 
benefits (D'Aunno, Sutton, and Price, 1991; Elsbach, 1994). 
By demonstrating how conformity can enhance legitimacy, 
despite costs to efficiency, the present study provides 
strong evidence for the independent effect of institutional 
processes on organizational outcomes. The findings illustrate 
how an institutional framework that incorporates both legiti- 
macy and performance consequences can explain why orga- 
nizations would adopt practices that no longer yield competi- 
tive advantage. 
The findings also extend Edelman's (1992) research on the 
adoption of affirmative action offices, which inferred con- 
formity to institutional norms from the adoption of more 
elaborate affirmative action structures, by actually measuring 
conformity to normative forms of adoption. Our findings also 
suggest that conformity does not necessarily imply greater 
structural complexity. The total number of quality practices 
introduced by later TQM adopters was not more than the 
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number introduced by early adopters. Thus, while institution- 
alization did not lead to greater structural complexity, it did 
lead to greater conformity. 
This study contributes to the nascent empirical literature ex- 
amining organizational consequences of TQM. Our findings 
suggest that recent theory and research in this area (e.g., 
Reger et al., 1994; Powell, 1995a) may have underspecified 
the organizational consequences of TQM by focusing exclu- 
sively on technical performance benefits and paying scant 
attention to differences between early and late adopters. 
The observed tendency for later adopters to trade organiza- 
tional efficiency benefits for legitimacy benefits from TQM 
adoption provides an alternative explanation for Powell's 
(1995a) recent finding that TQM did not yield consistent per- 
formance improvements. Although Powell concluded that 
TQM itself does not generate competitive advantage, it ap- 
pears that TQM provides different kinds of competitive ad- 
vantage, depending on the time of adoption and the result- 
ant degree of conformity to norms of implementation. This 
contrast effect in organizational benefits from TQM between 
early and late adopters is amplified in hospital systems and 
alliances, because social network ties facilitate customization 
for early adopters and conformity for later adopters. 
This study raises several questions for future research. 
While the theoretical framework developed in this study ex- 
tends prior research on TQM by examining the form of TQM 
adoption, future research might devote more attention to the 
process of implementation. For instance, researchers could 
measure variation across organizations in the time required 
to implement TQM fully and explore how speed of imple- 
mentation might affect the consequences of adoption and 
conformity. Relationships between conformity, legitimacy, 
and performance may be even stronger among hospitals that 
implement their TQM programs more quickly. 
While this study examines legitimacy benefits derived from 
the form of TQM adoption, future research might also ad- 
dress the separate question of whether adoption itself cre- 
ates reputational benefits or costs, especially among early 
adopters. For instance, adopting hospitals might benefit from 
pro-innovation biases (Rogers, 1983; Abrahamson, 1991). 
Alternatively, there is some evidence that innovators are met 
with skepticism until they can demonstrate efficiency ben- 
efits from adoption or until more organizations adopt (e.g., 
Carroll and Hannan, 1989). As Blumenthal (1995) has docu- 
mented, there was some question initially about whether 
TQM was appropriate for hospitals because of entrenched 
resistance from doctors and other professionals to any inter- 
ference from administrators and because hospital organiza- 
tions are inherently bureaucratic. There was also fairly wide- 
spread suspicion that TQM might be used by hospitals as a 
cover for cost cutting that would reduce the quality of care. 
Future empirical research could also extend this study by 
examining the extent to which our framework can predict 
the form and consequences of TQM in other contexts. While 
hospitals face strong legitimacy pressures, such pressures 
are increasingly being felt in other sectors as well, notably in 
service industries such as financial services and telecommu- 
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nications. Moreover, organizations across many sectors are 
being subjected to growing external review of their quality 
practices, as well as increased incentives for participating in 
external evaluations (Powell, 1995b). In recent years applica- 
tions for the Malcolm Baldridge Award from manufacturing 
and service organizations have increased considerably. Sev- 
eral authors have suggested that the growing symbolic value 
of the Baldridge Award has widely influenced quality prac- 
tices (Sen, 1991; Powell, 1 995b; Puffer and McCarthy, 
1996). Most of the award criteria are based on specific qual- 
ity processes rather than outcomes (United States Depart- 
ment of Commerce, 1994), much like the criteria used by 
the JCAHO to evaluate hospitals. A primary reason why 
companies are making greater efforts to qualify for the Bald- 
ridge Award is that they face increasing pressure from exter- 
nal stakeholders to demonstrate organizational effectiveness. 
Useem (1993: 57, 71, 213) has documented how organiza- 
tional changes, including the introduction of TQM practices, 
have been influenced strongly by the growing power and 
activism of large institutional investors. Moreover, compa- 
nies are also under considerable pressure from customers 
and suppliers to show due diligence in improving quality 
(Sen, 1991; Shiba, Graham, and Walden, 1993; Powell, 
1995b). Thus, with respect to quality practices in particular, 
manufacturing and service companies may increasingly expe- 
rience legitimacy pressures similar to those experienced by 
hospitals. 
Future research might also benefit from adapting theoretical 
perspectives on the diffusion of fads and fashions to under- 
standing the spread of TQM. There is clearly much overlap 
between the theoretical mechanisms underlying the diffu- 
sion of fads and fashions and those leading to institutional- 
ization (e.g., see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Abrahamson, 
1991). Both literatures emphasize the role of collective social 
pressures and social interaction in diffusion (e.g., Smelser, 
1962; Blumer, 1969; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and a 
management fad can acquire institutional status to the ex- 
tent that it becomes taken for granted or socially expected 
as an element of the organization (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Zucker, 1983). The literature on fads and fashions could pro- 
vide unique insights into the diffusion and isomorphism of 
TQM initiatives, in that it offers a rich analysis of how opin- 
ion leaders and gatekeepers, such as the mass media, con- 
sulting firms, and business schools, mediate the diffusion 
process (,e.g., Hirsch, 1972; Peterson and Berger, 1975; 
Abrahamson, 1991, 1996). Such perspectives could usefully 
supplement the perspective developed in this study and may 
provide insights into why particular TQM practices acquired 
external legitimacy as taken-for-granted elements of TQM, 
while other practices did not. 
While the findings of this study showed a transition from 
customization to conformity in implementation as TQM be- 
came institutionalized over time, there may be further stages 
of institutionalization. One possibility is that TQM may ulti- 
mately become deinstitutionalized as poor performance out- 
comes of later adopters reduce its legitimacy, thus allowing 
organizations to discard or to customize their programs 
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(Oliver, 1992). Alternatively, institutional pressures may per- 
sist, but performance problems may ultimately lead organiza- 
tions to resist them openly (Kraatz and Zajac, 1995). Perhaps 
a more likely outcome, however, is that the nature of con- 
formity could evolve over time from complete acquiescence 
to institutional pressures to a more complex form of con- 
formity in which organizations formally adopt normative TQM 
programs but also customize their actual, informal practices 
to the unique needs of the organization. Just as interorgani- 
zational network ties facilitated customization of TQM pro- 
grams for early adopters and substantive conformity for later 
adopters, social networks might ultimately facilitate symbolic 
decoupling, in which organizations conform to institutional 
pressures by adopting normative TQM programs at the level 
of formal policy, while customizing their TQM programs at 
the level of substantive action. 
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APPENDIX: Total Quality Practices Survey Items 
1. Periodic assessment of community needs. 
2. Benchmarking (i.e., comparing) quality improvement results against 
those of other health care organizations. 
3. Formation of project teams to improve quality. 
4. Reporting of results by project teams to improve quality. 
5. Formation of a Quality Improvement Council or Steering Committee. 
6. Senior management training in TQM principles and methods. 
7. Middle management training in TQM principles and methods. 
8. Physician training in TQM principles and methods. 
9. Overall review and evaluation of our approach to improving quality. 
10. Incorporation of TQM criteria into the reward and performance appraisal 
system. 
11. Use of nominal group methods. 
12. Use of brainstorming. 
13. Use of pareto diagrams. 
14. Use of cause and effect ("Fishbone") diagrams. 
15. Use of control charts. 
16. Use of run charts. 
17. Use of histograms. 
18. Use of scatter diagrams. 
19. Use of process flow charts. 
20. Use of affinity diagrams. 
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